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In  this paper we discuss the effect of financial liberalization,  using panel data for
Ecuadorian firms. After describing the main thrust of  the reforms and the general
macroeconomic  developments,  we document the changes that have occurred  in firms'
financial structure  and in the allocation  of credit. The evidence  suggests that there has
been a reallocation  of resources toward larger and older firms after liberalization.  We
also investigate  econometrically  whether  financial  reform has helped in directing credit
to more efficient firms. Our results, based  on measures  of technical  efficiency  obtained
from estimating  stochastic  production  frontiers,  show that indeed  this has been the case
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I.- INTRODUCTION
It  has been forcefully argued that heavily regulated financial systems--
which are characterized by  very low interest rates, government interference in  the
distribution of  credit,  and  preferential treatment for  priority  sectors--have serious
drawbacks.' For example, a ceiling on interest rates may discourage savings. Implicit
or explicit subsidies and administrative  controls on the allocation of credit may not
provide  financial intermediaries with  the  right  in_entives to  screen and  monitor
borrowers.  Moreover,  it  is  possible that  larger  and  politically better  connected
borrowers benefit the most from directed credit programs. Finally, subsidized interest
rates may encourage  investment  projects with low yields and may favor the adoption  of
highly capital-intensive  production  techniques.  Conversely,  the elimination  or reduction
of government interference with credit flows is thought to improve the efficiency of
resource allocation  by financial  intermediaries,  with beneficial  effects on the economy's
growth rate.
Evidence from firm panel from countries that have introduced financial
reforms can shed light on some of these issues. In this paper we present an overview  of
the effect of financial liberalization  on firms' performance and behavior in Ecuador,
and we discups how the impact of reform varies according to firms' size, age, and
market orientation. The main issue we address is the effect of policy changes  on credit
allocation. More specifically,  we investigate  econometrically  whether liberalization  has
helped in directing credit to more efficient firms. We base our empirical work on a
panel data set that contains balance-sheet  and profit and loss statements from a large
number  of manufacturing  cor ,,anies over the period 1983-1988.  In a companion  paper
(Jaramillo, Schiantarelli, and Weiss (1992)) we discuss whether  the importance of
financial constraints in firms'  investment decisions varies across firms and whether
liberalization  relaxed these constraints.
The structure  of this paper is as follows. Section  II gives an overview  of the
macroeconomic developments in Ecuador during the  1980s and describes the  main
policy changes that have occurred during this decade, with particular attention to the
ISee  McKinnon  (1973) and Shaw (1973). See  also Fry (1988) for a critical review.2
process of financial liberalization. Section III, using panel data for several hundred
companies,  describes and  interprets  the  evolution of  firms'  investment activity,
profitability, and financial  structure. Section IV discusses the change in the allocation
of debt before and after liberalization. We use our panel to recover firms'  spe*:ific
measures  of technical  efficiency  and to present econometric  evidence on the association
between efficiency  and debt distribution. In the conclusion  we summarize  our results.
II. MACROECONOMIC OVERVIEW AND POLICY CHANGES
The  economic prosperity Ecuador enjoyed during  the  1970s changed
dramatically in 1982, when a set of adverse shocks hit the economy. The drop in oil
prices  (oil is  the  main Ecuadorian export), higher intemational interest rates,  and
shrnking external financing  caused a severe balance of payments  disequilibrium,  with
the current account deficit reaching 11 percent of GDP.  In  1982 Ecuador initiated a
program of economic  adjustment,  as a precondition  to obtain funding  from international
agencies.  In May, the country signed the first Stabilization  Program with the IMF that
included devaluation, an increase in nominal interest rates, and a rise in the prices of
fuel and public services.
In  the  second quarter of  1983, Ecuador signed a  second and  s' icter
Stabilization Program with the IMF. Besides further devaluation and a  reduction of
public subsidies, the government introduced a crawling peg regime for the exchange
rate and approved an Emergency Law that froze government expenditures. Nominal
interest rates were increased  and some special  subsidized  rates were eliminated. Interest
rate dispersion  was reduced, but not eliminated.
The strategy of economic liberalization was confirmed and expanded in
1984: interest rate controls were partially lifted. The market was allowed to determine
rates for certificates of deposits called "polizas  de acumulacion".  In August of 1986,
interest rates on deposits and loans made with resources mobilized by the financial
institutions  were freed, and the real rate reached  positive levels.  Subsidized  credit lines
for special activities were eliminated or significantly  reduced. At the same time,  the
exchange rate was allowed to float; import controls, subsidies  and tariffs were reduced
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(1991), Informaci6n  Estadtstica  #1659, p.  15-21. M2 = MI  +  time and savings deposits; Ml=money
in circulation  plus demand  deposits;  M4 = M2 + all the financial  liabilities  of the financial  system  to the
private  sector. The difference between M4 and Ml  represents the savings captured by the financial
system  (financial  savings).  Ref.:  D:\THESIS\EXFILE\MONGRAFI.DOC
Prior  to  the financial  reform,  Ecuador  had  unusually low financial  depth
(M2/GDP,  M4/GDP,  (M4-M2)/GDP).  For  instance,  in  an  inter-country  study,
Ecuador  had the lowest level of  M2 relative  to GDP except for Peru,  a  country with
huge inflation and a lower  level of per  capita income (World Bank,  1985).  Figure  1
shows the decline of different monetary aggregates relative to GDP from 1976 to 1983.
The interest rate policy followed during the 1970s and early  1980s was one
of the most importaft  reasons for this poor record in financial resources mobilization.
Until 1981, interest rates were fixed at levels far below the inflation rate.  In 1981, for
example,  the inflation rate was 13.4 percent,  while the deposit rate for  savings was 6
percent.  As a  result of negative interest  rates (see Figure  2),  financial savings were
discouraged,  and foreign financial assets and domestic inflation hedges (real estate,  for
example) were more desirable than deposits with the banking system.
The macroeconomic policy changes of 1983, together with the beginning of
financial liberalization in  1984, led to a nominal interest rate closer to the inflation rate,
but  still  below  it.  With  the introduction  of  the  "polizas de  acumulacion"  at  market
determined  rates,  real rates on  deposits became positive in  1986 for  the first time  in
two decades, as we can see in Figure  2. The higher return on these new certificates of4
deposit made themn  one of the most popular financial instruments, and they expanded
rapidly. As a result, the financial system was better able to mobilize resources, and
financial deepening improved. Figure 1 shows how the ratio M2/GDP increased from
around  17 percent to  23  percent, mainly due to  the  increase of  the  "polizas de
acumulacion". Moreover, it is interesting to note that financial savings (i.e. M4-M1)
increased even faster, from around 6 percent of GDP to 13 percent, as a result of a
movement away from narrowly defined money into the  more attractive financial
instruments. The real rate reduction  that occurred in 1988 and 1989 and the successive
increase  in 1990  will be discussed  below.
Figure  2
NOMINAL  AND  REAL  EFFECTIVE  INTEREST  RATES
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Annex  Table 2.8. See footnote  for definition  of interest  rates. 2
2The real effective  rate (r) for a 90 days nominal  deposit  rate (i) was calculated  as
r =  (1 + i/4)  1, where  7r  is the average  annual inflation  rate.5
The development  of  the financial sector in  Ecuador is closely related to
Central Bank credit policies.  The Central Bank granted credit to the public sector, to
public financial  institutions  (mainly  the Banco Nacional  de Fomento (BNF)), to private
financial  institutions, and directly to the private sector.  A large percentage of lending
in the  financial system was through special, subsidized credit lines for projects in
particular sectors, including agriculture, livestock, small industry, handicraft, and
tourism.  These  lines  were  financied through  forced investments by  the  banks
I2inancial Funds) and subsidized, Central Bank  rediscounts.
The role of the Central Bank  as a source of loanable  funds for private banks
and financial companies  increased steadily  during the 1970s and early 1980s. Figure 3
shows  how the outstanding  credit of the Central Bank  as a percentage of GDP increased
from less than v percent in the mid seventies  to around 15 percent in 1984.
Figure  3
CENTRAL BANK  CREDIT/GDP
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In other words, given the policy of low interest rates, the financial system
had become increasingly  dependent  on the Central Bank lines of credit. Private banks
and financial institutions were acting as  recyclers of cheap Central Bank credit. In
addition, low preferential lending rates provided firms that had access to credit with an
incentive to  choose a  highly leveraged capital structure. Firms excluded from the6
system faced high borrowing costs in the parallel or foreign markets, or an outright
inability to raise external finance.
It  is  true,  therefore,  that  prior  to  reform  the  financial system  was
"repressed" in  the sense that administrative controls over  interest rates az.d credit
allocation  limited  its  efficiency  in  intermediation and  allocation of  resources.
Nevertheless, before liberalization, Ecuador private sector enjoyed a period of rapid
growth in total credit. The flow  of credit to the private sector expanded at an average
annua! rate of 1?.2 percent in the 1973-1981  period, and at 8.2 percent in the 1982-
1985 period. However, the main reason for this credit expansion  was the rapid growth
of Central Bank  direct and indirect lines of subsidized  credit to the private sector, as we
saw in Figure 3.3
Certainly financial reform and interest rate  liberalization improved the
ability of  the  system to  capture financial savings. Simultaneously  though, reforms
included a drastic contraction of  most of the directed credit from the Central Bank.
After 1984, Central Bank credit to the private sector was reduced from 17 percent to
less than 4 percent of GDP. Obviously, this contraction meant a severe reduction of
credit availability  to the private sector. The flow of new debt (in real terms) decreased
at an average annual rate of 6.8 percent between 1986 and 1989, largely because the
Central Bank contracted the credit granted to financial institutions. Such contraction
overshadows any  increase  that  may  have  occurred  in  the  amount  of  savings
intermediated  by financial institutions because of rising real interest rates in the mid
1980s.
In the second half oi  the 1980s, Ecuador was again subject to a series of
adverse shocks.  The oil price collapse at the end of 1986, and a major earthquake  in
1987, caused a  decline in  GDP  of  6  percent. This  decline,  together with  fiscal
3Besides  domestic  credit, the private  sector had access to foreign  loans. Until the early 1980s, domestic
borrowers found  borrowing from abroad attractive  since interest rates were lower in the world markets,
and Ecuador had had a fixed exchange  rate of 25 sucres per dollar for more than a  decade. Private
foreign  debt increased  froir  '2 million  in 1972  to $1.6 billion in 1982. In many cases, these loans were
guaranteed  by Ecuadorian  c.-amercial banks  as off-balance  sheet items. The borrowing  stopped abruptly
in 1982 when the Mexican  debt crisis sharply reduced new lending and the Ecuadorian  Goverment
devalued  from 25 to 33 sucres per dollar in 1982, and to 42 in 1983, starting thereafter a crawling  peg
system. Devaluation,  together  with higher intemational  interest rates, dramatically  increased the cost of
servicing private foreign debt in terms of domestic currency and put many firns  into bankruptcy.
Ecuador began a program of relief for private foreign debt, a debt swap in which the Central Bank
accepted  private debtors liabilities  to foreign  creditors  and became  a creditor to those debtors by issuing
sucretized, stabilization  credits". The conversion  of debts from dollars to sucres  was done on favarable
terms for the debtor. For details  of this program see Younger  (1990), Uquillas (1991).7
mismanagement,  caused the worst inflation in Ecuadorian history.  Prices increased at
an average  of 58 percent and 76 percent in 1988  and 1989. Some limits were imposed
on loan interest rates (specifically,  the spread was limited cver the saving deposit rate),
real interest rates became negative, financial deepening was again discouraged, and
total  credit to  the  private sector  fell even  faster.  A  new  stabilization plan  vas
introduced. Beginning in  1989, tk.s authorities tried to cut inflationary pressures by
reducing  Central Bank credit to the public sector, as well as by reducing the fiscal
deficit. Average inflation rate in 1990 dropped to 48.5 percent and stabilized  thereafter
at close to 50 percent. After the abnormal inflation of 1988 and 1989, nominal interest
rates began to catch up with prices. Real lending  rates turned positive again in 1990, as
limits on the spread were eased.  Similarly, the M2/GDP ratio (and the other measures
of financial  deepening)  stopped  declining  and began to rise again after 1989, as Figure
1 shows. It is interesting to note that even though interest rates were largely market
determined, real rates were highly negative in  1988 and 1989. Different explanations
have  been  suggested. The  unusually high  level  of  inflation  might  have  been
unanticipated  or seen as temporary. Since agents expected a future drop in the inflation
rate (as in 1983-1984,  after the floods), nominal rates did not increase as fast as actual
inflation did. There are other possible reasons for the lagging of nominal rates behind
inf.*tion. It  is  possible that banks did  not  want to  raise  nominal interest rates
drast;kally, since  the  increase of  debt  service could  have  put  many  firms  into
bankruptcy. With  widespread bankruptcies, the  financial stability  of  the  banks
themselves  could have been jeopardized, as occurred in Argentina and Uruguay (see
Tybout, 1986).
What effects did the changes in macro and financial policies during the
1980s  have on the cost of extemal finance? In the mid eighties, the decrease  of Central
Bank credit to financial institutions  and the liberalization  of interest rates had a severe
impact on companies. Firms, in particular those over leveraged  after a decade of easy
credit, faced two shocks: their cheap sources of credit were drying up, and the cost of
servicing the outstanding debt was increasing. The real effective lending rate, after
years of being negative or close to zero, reached 10 percent  in 1986 and 1987.  Even
the interest on preferential  credit from the Central Bank increased, although it was still
negative in real terms, as we can see in Figure 4.4  More important, the availability  of
4There are several subsidized  lines of credit from the Central Bank, each with its own conditions  and
interest rate. For the purpose of illustration  we present an average of the lending rate of banks and
financial institutions  using resources  from the Central Bank under one of the most popular programs,
preferential  rediscounts.8
preferential credit decreased substantially  over the years. Real non-preferential  lending
rates became  negative in 1988  and 1989  and returned to positive levels in 1990.9
Figure  4
NOMINAL  AND  REAL  EFFECTIVE  INTEREST  RATES
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Table  2.8.
What was the  behavior of  aggregate investment during this period of
structural change? The  1970s had been years of  high investment growth rates that
paralleled the general expansion  of the economy (see Figure 5). Cheap credit and the
fixed exchange rate policy partly explain this robust investment  performance. In 1980-
1982, investment expenditure remained high,  but  following the  1982-1984 crisis,
private investment  decreased by an average of 6.6 percent (with a peak decrease equal
to  36.2 percent in  1983).5  Investment performance is  also closely related to  the
availability and cost of foreign exchange, because a significant proportion of capital
goods are imported. In the early eighties, before the crisis,  the share of imported
investment  goods out of total investment was as high as 47 percent. 6 Between 1970
and 1982, Ecuador kept the nominal exchange rate fixed. Inflation, though moderate
during the 1970s, caused a continuous  real appreciation  of the domestic currency; this
tendency favored imports. With the crisis and the intioduction of import controls,
5Estimated  private investment  includes  investment  by some firms that  have substantial  public  ownership.
6Imported investment  refers to gross accumulation  of imported fixed assets. Domestic  investment  refers
to gross accumulation  of domestic  fixed  assets.10
foreign exchange availability decreased, while the  devaluation that followed made
imports more expensive. As we have just seen, investment  expenditures  decreased, in
particular purchases of imported capital goods, whose share of total investment fell to
an average of 34 percent. Investment activity showed some improvement during the
1985-1989  period, when investment increased at a yearly average of 1.8 percent. We
will discuss  the behavior  of investment  in more detail in the next section.
Figure  5
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m. FINANCIAL  REFORM  AND FIRMS'  BEHAVIOR  IN THE 1980s:
DESCRIPTIVE  EVIDENCE  FROM COMPANY  DATA
We  have seen that financial liberalization in Ecuador is  an incremental
process that starts in 1983-84, when interest rate controls are partly lifted.  A marked
acceleration  takes place in 1986 with the elimination  of most interest rate controls and a
further reduction  in the role of directed credit programs. In order to evaluate the micro
effect of financial reform, we rely on a large panel of 853 Ecuadorian manufacturing
companies  during the 1983-1988  period.  For 420 companies  the data are available for
the entire period. The data have been collected  by the Superintendencia  de Companias
of Ecuador and consist of balance sheets and profit and loss accounts (Appendix A
contains a  fuller description of the data). The information  allows us to assess how
financial liberalization affected financial and real decisions and how such an effect
varied across different categories  of firms, in other words, small or large, exporting or
nonexporting,  young or old. Given the nature of policy  changes in Ecuador, ideally one
would want to  have information covering a  longer time period before and after
liberalization. Unfortunately  data are not available  before 1983, and not yet accessible
for the post 1988 period.  However, much can be learned if we split our sample of
firms in 1986, since 1986 represents  a turning point in the reform process.
We start by describing the trends in  firms' profitability, investment, and
capital intensity. We then investigate the changes in companies' financial structures.
We conclude this  section by  presenting descriptive evidence on how liberalization
affects the allocation  of credit.
III.1.  PROFITABILITY,  INVESTMENT, AND CAPITAL INTENSITY
During the period 1984-1988, the manufacturing  sector had to cope with
several policy changes. Financial liberalization  was introduced, and tariff protection
and exchange rate controls were somewhat  relaxed. Moreover, during the early 1980s
the balance of payments  crisis required a severe macro adjustment. At an overall level,
the readjustment process did not greatly affect the profitability of  the firms in our
sample (see Table 1). However, the evolution of profits was not homogeneous  across
different categories of firms. If we divide our sample according to  the size of  the
capital stock in the initial year, both indicators of profitability  (operating  profits relative
to capital, S/K, and after tax net profits relative to  capital, P/K)  suggest that the
adjustment  process was particularly severe for small firms that produced  mainly for the12
domestic market and benefited from subsidies  and protection. 7 Micro companies also
saw their profits decrease substantially. 8 Medium and large firms did better. Operating
profits relative to the capital stock remained basically stable for medium-sized  firms
and  decreased slightly  for  large  firms.  Net  profits  relative  to  capital decreased
marginally ;or medium-sized  firms  and increased  for large firms. 9
If we divide the sample according to firms' initial value added, the picture
is different for small firms; now their profit rates increase.  It remains true, however,
that  whatever the  partition criterion or  the  measure of  profitability is,  large and
medium-sized  firms were the most profitable  in the post liberalization  period.
Cutting the sample by age adds some interesting information.  As Table 1
shows, older firms tended to be the most profitable, and they increased or maintained
their profit rates after 1986. Younger  firms fared less well, and their profit rates fell.
Perhaps one reason that younger and smaller (according to the size of the
capital stock) firms suffered  after 1986  is their market orientation. Smaller  and younger
firms are basically oriented to the domestic market. If we divide the sample according
to whether a firm had exported  part of its production for at least one year, we can see
that exporting firms not only had a higher rate of return, but also were performing
better after liberalization  than were dhmestic market firms.  While P/K increased for
exporting firms, it fell for firms oriented to the domestic market. S/K decreased for
both groups, but relatively more for domestically  oriented  firms.
In  the previous section we described how private aggregate investment
decreased sharply after 1983. Our sample is picking up the years of recovery after the
crisis.  At an aggregate  level, firms increased  the investment  rate, I/K, from an average
of 19.2 percent in the 1984-1985  period to 21.4 percent in 1986-1988.  If the sample is
divided  according to the size of the capital stock, we can see that smaller firms seemed
more dynamic in that they had higher investment rates; however, micro and small
firms, especially  the former, reduced investment  rates significantly  after 1986, as Table
1 shows. However, the classification  of firms according to the size of  value added
7See the footnotes to table 2A in the appendix  for  a precise definition of size,  age, and  market
orientation.
8Note that the quality of data for micro firms is probably  not as good as for the other firms. Moreover,
the number  of micro firms in our sample  is small.
9Micro and small firms appear to be somewhat  more profitable un the first period, relative to larger
firms. This may be an artifact  caused  by the use of capital  stock to split the sample  by size. In the second
period, however,  medium  and large firms appear  as more  profitable.13
Table 1
PROFITABILITY,  INVESTMENT,  AND CAPITAL  INTENSITY
(Summary statistics)
._  z:Period  V/K  |I/K  EL/K  S/K  P/K
All  84-85  1.042  0.192  1.255  0.372  0.139
86-88  1.054  0.214  1.384  0.343  0.146
Size  Micro  84-85  2.340  0.616  5.661  0.392  0.232
by  86-88  2.100  0.347  4.976  0.316  0.144
capital  Small  84-85  1.755  0.331  3.159  0.414  0.175
stock  86-88  1.326  0.263  2.757  0.243  0.076
Medium  84-85  1.197  0.233  '.825  0.387  0.170
86-88  1.236  0.232  1.976  0.401  0.165
Large  84-85  0.983  0.179  1.069  0.368  0.130
______  86-88  0.991  0.207  1.167  0.331  0.144
Size  Micro  84-85  0.325  0.185  0.555  0.005  -0.014
by  86-88  0.306  0.182  0.340  0.104  -0.005
value  Small  84-85  0.662  0.202  1.125  0.109  0.004
added  _  86-88  0.840  0.201  1.398  0.170  0.070
Medium  84-85  0.872  0.220  1.329  0.257  0.076
86-88  0.830  0.219  1.397  0.266  0.081
Large  84-85  1.167  0.183  1.288  0.449  0.177
___  _  __  _  86-88  1.240  0.219  1.499  0.429  0.194
Age  Youngest  84-85  0.890  0.220  1.254  0.278  0.067
86-88  0.792  0.242  1.253  0.220  0.025
Yuung  84-85  0.877  0.201  1.311  0.264  0.086
______  86-88  0.789  0.218  1.302  0.201  0.064
Old  84-85  0.753  0.174  0.899  0.287  0.067
86-88  0.791  0.198  1.003  0.294  0.103
Oldest  84-85  1.307  0.199  1.497  0.472  0.213
86-88  1.403  0.219  1.734  0.454  0.232
Market  Domestic  84-85  1.007  0.199  1.355  0.351  0.130
________  86-88  0.968  0.218  1.421  0.322  0.122
Export  84-85  1.074  0.183  1.124  0.400  0.149
86-88  1.181  0.206  1.327  0.375  0.183
Notation:  K=capital  stock  (fixed  assets,  except  land)  at  replacement  value;  I=gross  investment;
V=value  added; EL=efficiency  units of labor (total wage bill  divided by wage index in manufacturing);
S=  operating profits (before tax and interest payments, net of depreciation); P=net  profits (after tax and
interest payments, net of depreciation).
suggests that there were no major changes in the investment  activity of smaller firms.
The  investment by  larger  firms  increased in  the  post  liberalization period.  No
significant  changes were observed  for medium-sized  firms.14
The investment rates for different age groups show an increase after 1986
for all categories. It is interesting  to note that the youngest firms are the ones that had
the highest investment rates in both periods.  Finally, if  the sample is divided by
markets, firms oriented to  the domestic market as well as exporting firms increased
their investment  rates.
Table 1 presents two indicators of the capital intensity of production, the
value added to capital ratio, V/K, and EL/K, where EL denotes labor measured in
efficiency units.10 Both suggest that there was some decrease on average in the level of
capital intensity, particularly for medium-sized  and large firms.  The increase in the
cost of borrowing is one explanat:on  for this trend.  There is some evidence that small
and micro firms may have become more capital intensive, but the evidence is more
mixed depending  upon the indicator of capital intensity and the criterion used for size.
The classification  according to age suggests that the decrease in capital intensity was
particularly  true for the older firms (which  are also more likely to be larger).
1H.2. FIRMS' FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
Perhaps the  most dramatic changes during this period occurred in  the
financial  structure  of the firms. As described  above, until 1985  interest rates were fixed
administratively  at a low level, and the real cost of credit was negative. Moreover,
subsidized  credit directed to specific  groups of companies  (small)  or activities (exports)
played a  very important role.  Small industry, for example, had access to  special
subsidized  credit lines like FOPINAR  (Fund for Small Industry and Handicraft), which
are backed by refinancing by the Corporacion Financiera Nacional, and to  Fondos
Financieros, which was supported by rediscount lines at the Central Bank. Exporting
firms had access to  cheap credit through  FOPEX (Fund for Export Promotion).
FOPINAR was  judged  to  be  a  well-administered program  with  high  rates  of
collection."  Since part of  the credit given to  micro and  small industries was at
subsidized rates,  the  average nominal cost  of  debt, in  other words,  total  interest
payments divided by the  stock of debt (INT/BT), was 7.5  percent and 9 percent,
respectively, while medium-sized  and large firms were paying 10.9 percent and 15.4
^ent, respectively  (see Table 2). It is generally  thought that, in financially  repressed
101ndustry  specific wage indices for unskilled workers have been used to calculate labor in efficiency
units. See Griliches and Ringstad  (1971).
1 l1See  World Development  Report (1989).15
economies, the cost of debt is higher for companies, usually small and young, that do
not have access to the formal credit markets. However, the existence of  subsidized
credit to these groups may explain why the overall average cost of debt was lower.1 2
Ideally, one should  distinguish  between firms within a group that had preferential  credit
and those that did not, but we do not have this information.
The introduction of market-determined  interest rates caused an immediate
increase in nominal rates.  Manufacturing  companies' average nominal cost of debt
(INT/BT) increased  after 1985. This is true for most categories of firms. If companies
are divided by their capital stock, the greatest increase was for micro and small firms,
for which the cost of de~bt  went from 2.8 percent to 9.3 percent and from 7.5 percent to
10.6 percent, respectively. The same pattern is observed if value added is  used to
divide the sample. The increase is also very significant for the, youngest companies,
which  experienced an increase from 10.9 percent to  14.4 percent. Note that the
dispersion  in the average cost of debt tends to become smaller after 1986.13  However,
larger and older firms in general still experienced  a higher cost.  14
As we can see from Table 2, up to 1985 the degree of leverage, defined as
the stock of debt divided by the stock of capital (BT/K), was higher for firms that were
targets of directed and subsidized  credit from the Government, if we divide the sample
according to the size of the capital stock. Note that the value of the capital stock we
have used in separating small from medium firms is the one below which firms had
access to FOPINAR. During 1984-1985  small companies  had an average  leverage ratio
of 1.403, significantly  higher than medium  and large firms for which it equaled  0.927
and 0.880, respectively, as we can see in Table 2.  Similarly, exporting firms were
more leveraged than  those that sold only to the domestic market.  If age is used for
classifying firms, then the youngest firms were the ones with the higher degree of
leverage.
12  There can be an additional  accounting  problem, since  there are firms that  do not register  financial  costs
of debt trade credit as part of financial  costs, but as part of the costs of materials. In that sense, numbers
obtained for the average cost of credit should be interpreted  with care. If inflation gains are included,
then the average cost of debt becomes  negative, but the ranking  of firms according to the cost of debt
obviously  remains  the same.
13See Cho (1985) on  the reduction in the dispersion of the cost of debt across industries in Korea,
following financial  liberalization.
" 4This might be an accounting  artifact  since some firms do not register some financial  costs (for instance,
the implicit interest payments  on trade credit)  as interest  expenses.16
Table 2
FINANCIAL  STRUCTURE
(su  n  arystatiics)
Period  BT/K  BST/K  BLT/K  LA/K  TCN/K  INT/BT
All  ________  84-85  0.899  0.563  0.262  0.173  -0.074  0.139
86-88  0.648  0.407  _0.231  0.210  0.021  0.146
Size  Micro  84-85  0.905  0.522  0.060  0.221  -0.078  0.028
by  86-88  0.988  0.606  0.086  0.244  0.333  0.092
capital  Small  84-85  1.403  0.905  0.159  0.210  0.156  0.075
stock  86-88  0.883  0.482  0.122  0.269  0.290  0.106
Medium  84-85  0.927  0.616  0.158  0.202  -0.061  0.116
86-88  0.718  0.478  0.197  0.215  0.014  0.132
Large  84-85  0.880  0.542  0.290  0.163  -0.083  0.147
________  _____  86-88  0.621  0.386  0.239  0.209  0.012  0.152
Size  Micro  84-85  0.515  0.452  0.047  0.054  0.007  0.075
,  by _  _  _  86-88  0.446  0.162  0.078  0.037  0.074  0.157
value  Small  84-85  0.669  0.363  0.144  0.115  0.120  0.090
added  _  86-88  0.569  0.235  0.132  0.111  0.113  0.097
Medium  84-85  1.007  0.646  0.184  0.146  -0.068  0.109
________  _______  86-88  0.675  0.407  0.206  0.141  0.014  0.120
|Lage  84-85  0.901  0.552  0.309  0.193  -0.090  0.154
l_______ l______  l86-88  0.663  0.444  0.232  0.263  0.013  0.158
Age  Youngest  84-85  1.030  0.602  0.271  0.185  0.052  0.109
86-88  0.868  0.442  0.263  0.128  0.082  0.144
_  Young  84-85  0.857  0.540  0.183  0.099  -0.062  0.120
86-88  0.630  0.346  0.229  0.111  0.024  0.114
Old  84-85  0.989  0.602  0.293  0.157  -0.064  0.136
_______ _______  86-88  0.642  0.404  0.245  0.192  0.020  0.147
Oldest  84-85  0.825  0.535  0.257  0.200  -0.102  0.151
86-88  0.614  0.424  0.192  0.276  0.007  0.155
Market  Domestic  84-85  0.835  0.540  0.204  0.153  -0.029  0.138
86-88  0.655  0.412  0.202  0.195  0.045  0.142
Export  84-85  0.981  0.592  0.338  0.198  -0.133  0.139
_  _  1  86-88  0.640  0.402  0.247  0.236  -0.016  0.152
Notation: K=capital stock (fixed assets, except land) at replacement  value; BT=total debt; BST=total
short term debt; BLT=total long term debt; TCN=net trade credit (credit from suppliers  minus  credit to
clients); LA= stock of liquid assets;  INT= interest  paid.
The main liability of manufacturing  firms was short term debt (BST); small
and  medium firms-sized  had between three and five times more short term than long17
term debt (BLT). Large firms had only twice as much.' 5 Net commercial or trade
credit, defined as trade credit borrowed minus trade credit given, was not significant
during the 1984-1985  period except for small firms which were net debtors.  Medium-
sized and large firms were net creditors.
The situation changed considerably  after financial  liberalization.  There was
an overall process of adjustment of the financial structure that led to a reduction of
leverage. This adjustment  was particularly severe for small firms which reduced their
leverage from 1.403 to 0.883 in the period 1986-1988. Medium-sized  and large firms
also substantially  decreased their degree of leverage. If value added is used in defining
size categories,  we observe the same generalized reduction in leverage, but medium-
sized firms are the most highly leveraged  in the pre liberalization  period, and the ones
with the larger adjustment  in the post liberalization  period.
Firms of different  ages -- but particularly the youngest ones - also  showed
significant  efforts to reduce their degree of leverage. It is interesting  to note that in the
latter period the degree of leverage of different  aged firms tends to converge, although
the youngest firms were still the  most highly leveraged. If  the sample is divided
according to markets, then both domestically  oriented  and exporting  firms reduced their
degree of leverage, the latter more than the former.
Reduction of short term credit accounted for most of the reduction in the
degree of  leverage. Short term debt is  basically credit from banks and  financial
companies, which, as seen previously, suffered a significant  overall reduction during
the 1980s. Nevertheless,  short term credit was still the main liability for manufacturing
firms, as we can see in Table 2. Long term credit fell relative to the capital stock for
large and small companies; it rose for medium-sized  companies. Micro firms (which
had the smallest long term to capital ratio), increased it slightly after 1986.  If  we
divide the sample by age, older firms reduced their stock of long term debt relative to
capital. This ratio increased  for young firms  and did not change for the youngest.
A very important  change in this period was the increase in net trade credit
(TCN/K). For most groups across different  classifications,  an increase in the net trade
credit to capital ratio accompanied  the fall in their leverage ratio. The manufacturing
sector as a whole went from a net creditor position to a net debtor position. As we can
see in Table 2, this trend was particularly important for micro and small firms which
1 5Total debt is composed  by short term debt, long term debt and other liabilities.  Among  the latter, credit
from the owner is particularly important for small firms, which in general are family owned and
mmaged.18
increased the use of trade credit as a proportion of their capital stock from 0.078 to
0.333 and from 0.156 to 0.29, respectively. Medium-sized  and large firms, which had
been net suppliers of trade credit, became net users. If we divide by age, all but the
youngest companies  (which increased  their debt) also went from a creditor to a debtor
position.
This phenomenon has been observed in other developing countries after
financial  liberalization.  It is worth noting that, even if some administrative  and interest
rate controls are removed, firms may still encounter restrictions in  their access to
external funding because of  capital market imperfections caused by  informational
asymmetries. This explains why, after directed credit was eliminated, small firms had
to rely on suppliers' credit, for whom informational  asymmetries may be less severe.
Moreover, the short term nature of trade credits allows the provider to use nonrenewal
to continuously  monitor and discipline  the borrower, if necessary.
Finally,  Table 2  suggest that there  was an  overall  movement toward
improving the liquidity position of the firms. Liquid assets over capital stock (LA/K)
increased for  most categories of  firms in  the  manufacturing sector. The greatest
improvements  were achieved  by the largest and by the oldest firms. Micro firms are the
exception. The overall trend can be explained by the liberalization  of  interest rates,
which acted as an incentive  for financial  investment, leading to an increase  in the stock
of liquid assets held by companies.  16
IV.1. CREDIT  ALLOCATION
Was  there  any  significant reallocation of  the  available  credit  after
liberalization?  Which firms benefited  and which suffered?  Table 3 shows  the change in
the share of  new debt out of the total going to each type of firm, before and after
liberalization. Our data set suggests that indeed financial resources were redistributed
from small and medium-sized  firms to large firms. If we divide the sample by capital
stock, the share of new debt going to the latter increased from an average of 71.3
percent of total new debt in the  1984-1985  to 73.4 percent in  1986-1988, while the
share of small firms declined from 4.1 percent to 3.4 percent, and for medium-sized
firms from 24.3 percent to 22.8 percent. The share going to micro firms remained
basically constant. This pattern is even sharper if we divide our sample according to
16AMso  minimum  balance  requirement  by banks have become more important  after 1986, since directed
credit was reduced and banks had to rely mainly on funds collected  from the public. On the issue of
liquid asset accumulation  during financial  liberalization,  see also Tybout  (1986).19
value added. Large firms increased their share from 57.3% percent to 67.1 percent,
while medium-sized  firms reduced it from 32.4 percent to 24 percent, small firms from
3.6 percent to 2.9 percent, and micro firms from 6.6 percent to 5.9% percent.
Table 3
DISTRIBUTION  OF DEBT
(Summary statistics)
Period  SRV  SRI  SRABT  SRABT/
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  SR V
Size  Micro  84-85  0.001  0.002  0.003  2.877
by  _  86-88  0.004  0.003  0.004  1.036
capital  Small  84-85  0.033  0.035  0.041  1.214
stock  86-88  0.034  0.035  0.034  0.979
Medium  84-85  0.211  0.227  0.243  1.150
86-88  0.234  0.221  0.228  0.97 ,
Large  84-85  0.754  0.737  0.713  0.946
___  __  86-88  0.728  0.741  0.734  1.009
Size  Micro  84-85  0.017  0.050  0.066  3.829
by  86-88  0.018  0.058  0.059  3.267
value  Small  84-85  0.017  0.029  0.036  2.093
added  86-88  0.029  0.035  0.029  0.999
Medium  84-85  0.191  0.264  0.324  1.697
86-88  0.184  0.241  0.240  1.303
Large  84-85  0.774  0.658  0.573  0.740
86-88  0.768  0.666  0.671  0.874
Age  Youngest  84-85  0.058  0.080  0.068  1.168
86-88  0.072  0.109  0.070  0.983
Young  84-85  0.090  0.114  0.151  1.671
86-88  0.103  0.141  0.112  1.096
Old  84-85  0.253  0.310  0.447  1.765
86-88  0.251  0.305  0.328  1.307
Oldest  84-85  0.599  0.495  0.335  0.560
_________  _________  86-88  0.575  0.445  0.489  0.851
Market  Domestic  84-85  0.537  0.588  0.451  0.840
86-88  0.549  0.615  0.708  1.288
Export  84-85  0.463  0.412  0.549  1.185
86-88  0.451  0.385  0.292  0.649
Notation:  SRV=share  of value added out of total  value  added;  SRI=share  of  investment  out  of
total investment;  SRABT=share  of new debt out  of  total  new debt;  SRABT/SRV=  share  of  new
debt divided by the share of value added.20
It is important to highlight the concentration  of credit flows. Large firms
represent around 10 percent of the firms, and received around 70 percent of the new
credit. This phenomenon  reflects concentration  in production  as well, since large firms
also account for approximately  70 percent of sales and valued added. In fact, the last
column of Table 4 contains the ratio between the share of new debt received and the
share of value added. Note that micro firms, even though they had an insignificant
amount of new debt relative to the total, had almost three times as  much as  their
contribution to value added. Small and medium-sized  firms also had more new debt
relative to their value added. Only large firms had less new debt compared to their
share in value added. After liberalization,  firms of all types except large ones saw their
share  of new debt relative to their share  of valued  added decrease.
If we divide the sample  by age, we see a large increase  in the share of new
debt going to  the oldest firms.  In  contrast, young and  old  firms decreased their
respective shares.  The youngest firms basically experienced no change. All firms
except the oldest ones experienced  a decline in their share of new debt relative to their
share of value added.
The reduction of new debt was very significant for export-oriented firms.
The share of new debt of exporting firms to total new debt fell from 54.9 percent in
1984-1985  to 29.2 percent in 1986-1988.  Firms that sold only to the domestic market
increased from 45.1 percent to 70.8 percent. As we explained  before, this might be a
result of the reduction  of important  directed credit lines for exports in 1986. Because  of
this reduction, exporting firms received much less new credit relative to their share in
value added after liberalization.
In  the final analysis, it appears that liberalization  helped to direct credit
toward larger and older firms. Moving from markets with administrative  controls on
quantities  and interest rates to less regulated  markets does not mean moving  to a world
of perfect capital markets. Moreover, since informational  asymmetries remain, credit
flows to firms that are less likely to suffer from those asymmetries, like older and
larger firms.  17
IV.2. EFFICIENCY AND THE ALLOCATION OF CREDIT
The foregoing  analysis suggests  that financial  liberalization  helped to direct
credit toward older and larger firms.  Large firms (together with medium-sized  ones)
17On  these issues  see Stiglitz  and Weiss  (1981) and Gertler and Rose (1991).21
also exhibit higher rates of profit after liberalization. It would be useful to investigate
in more depth how the allocation  of credit is associated  with firms' characteristics. The
question we address in  this section is  whether financial liberalization succeeded in
directing resources to more efficient firms.' 8 We also investigate the reallocation  of
credit across different  industries.
One could adopt various concept of efficiency.  We will focus here on
technicel efficiency, which measures  how close a firm is to the production possibility
frontier for a  given quantity of  capital and labor.1 9 The econometric estimation of
technical efficiency with  a  stochastic frontier, when only  cross  section data  are
available, has been analyzed by  Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977). Schmidt and
Sickles (1984) discuss the estimation procedures that are appropriate when panel data
are available. 20 They show  that technical  efficiency  can be estimated using pooled cross
section-time series observatic  :s  without making restrictive assumptions about  the
distribution of the error term, as in the case of a single cross section. More precisely,
consider the following  model:
(1)  Yit  =  a +  P'xit  +  eit  -xi
where i=  ,...  N firms, and t= 1,... T periods, Yit  refers to output of firm i in period t,
xit is a vector of inputs used by firm i in period t, eit is a random shock, 'i  captures
firm specific  and time invariant technical  inefficiency  of plant i, and we assume that ui
Ž:  0. We can rewrite the model  defining (xi = a - ui as:
(2)  yit = ai  +  P xit + cit
Estimates of  ai  can  be  used  directly  as  a  measure of  efficiency.
Alternatively,  we can take advantage  of the fact that ui  2 0 to normalize  the estimates.
Provided that N is large, we can assume that for the most efficient firm in the sample
180n the effect of efficiency on the capital structure of Colombian  firms, see Atiyas (1991).  On the
general issue of financial  repression and firms' capital structure, see also Faini ,  Galli and Giannini
(1991) on  the case of Southern  Italy.
19See  Farrel (1957).
20See  also Schmidt  (1985). For applications  to data for less developed  countries, see Tybout, De Melo,
and Corbo  (1990), Tybout and Westbrook  (1990), Liu (1991).22
ui  equals zero. Then, defining a  =  max ( ai  ),  each firm efficiency index can be
calculated as - ui =  -(a  - ai).
If we assume that  xi is fixed, we can obtain consistent estimates of  the
parameters (when the x's  are independent  of  the eit ) using the  "within" estimator.
Having estimated  ,3, an estimate  of ai can then be recovered by averaging the residuals
for each firm over time. Consistency  of the estimate for ai requires T to go to infinity.
Alternatively,  if we assume that the ai are random, we can recover consistent  estimates
for 1 using a feasible GLS estimator, provided  the x's  are not correlated with ai.
Again, a consistent  estimate of the ai  (for T going to infinity) can be obtained by
averaging the residuals for each firm over time.  Finally, if we assume that the x's are
not independent of eit,  we can obtain consistent estimates of  ,B by using a  GMM
estimator  applied to the model in differences  (see Arellano  and Bond (1991), (1988)).
For ai,  we proceed as in the previous  two cases.
We have used all three alternative estimation methods, and we have also
included  time dummies  to control for technical  progress or other macro shocks  like the
earthquake registered in  Ecuador in  1987. In  obtaining econometric estimates of
technical efficiency we  have  used  the  balanced panel  of  420  firms  for  which
observations  exist for all the years. We concentrate  on the balanced sample because the
reliability  of our measure of technical efficiency depends  crucially upon the length of
the time dimension of the panel.  The most general equation we have estimated is a
translog valued  aaded production  function with adjustment  costs for capital:
(3) vit = ai  +  1 I 1 it + 12 1 2it + 03 kit + 7y (IIit2) + Y2  (12it) 2 + Y3  (kit) 2
+ Y4  (lit  12it) + Y5  (alit kit) + Y6  (12it kit  + Y7  iit  +  -it
where v is the log of real value added, 11 the log of blue collar labor measured in
efficiency units,2'  12  is the log of white collar labor measured in efficiency units, k is
the log of  the real capital stock (machinery, plant, and equipments) measured at its
replacement value, and i denotes investment. All variables are  measured at  1975
prices. The coefficients  will be allowed to  vary across industries in  some of  the
specifications.
Note that if y7 =0,  then adjustment  cost may be ignored, and the production function
is the usual translog  function. If yI to Y7  are all equal to zero, then equation (3) reduces
2;Labor in efficiency units was calculated  by dividing the nominal wage bill by the wage index for
nunufacturing.23
to a simple Cobb-Douglas  function. An interesting special case we will investigate is
the  one  in  which  constant returns  to  scale  are  imposed  for  the  Cobb-Douglas
specification. One justification for imposing constant returns to  scale is that, if the
capital stock is  measured with error, the fixed effect and the GLS estimate of the
degree of returns to scale in the unrestricted  model will be biased downward (Griliches
and Hausman (1986)). In this case, we will find spurious positive association  between
efficiency  and size.  Most of our estimated  models  do indeed suggest  decreasing  returns
to scale, including the ones estimated  by GMM on differenced  data.  All the results are
reported in Appendix B.  Table 4 presents the correlation between the measures of
efficiency based on different specification  of  the production function and different
estimation methods. As one can see, most of them are highly correlated ,and hence it
should be no surprise that they yield similar results when they are used to  investigate
the determinants  of credit allocation. For this reason, we present the results only for a
small subset  of our efficiency  measures.
Table 4
CORRELATION  BETWEEN  DIFERENT MEASURES OF EFFICIENCY
TLAC  TLACO  IV  REFF  TLIND  CD  CDIND  TLNAC  CRS  CRSO  CRSI
TLAC  1.000  0.946  0.940  0.713  0.928  0.991  0.919  1.000  0.778  0.522  0.758
TLACO  1.000  0.927  0.551  0.884  0.951  0.895  0.946  0.651  0.545  0.577
IV  1.000  0.505  0.879  0.930  0.870  0.939  0.618  0.393  0.591
REFp  I  1.000  0.667  0.717  0.662  0.716  0.728  0.515  0.692
TLIND  1.000  0.919  0.909  0.928  0.957  0.733  0.936
CD  1.000  0.929  0.992  0.807  0.575  0.778
CDIND  1.000  0.920  0.753  0.565  0.714
TLNAC  1.000  0.781  0.526  0.761
CRS  1.000  0.807  0.953
CRSO  1.000  0.639
CRSI  1.000
Note: the indices of efficiency  are derived from different estimation  methods and specifications  of the
value added production  function,  as explained  below:
TLAC= translog function, adjustment  costs, fixed effect; TLACO= translog function, adjustment  costs,
fixed effect, 1984-1985  period; IV= translog function,  adjustment  costs, instrumental  variables;  REFF=
translog function, adjustment  costs, random  effect; TIND=  translog function, adjustment  costs, fixed
effect, by  industry; CD=  Cobb-Douglas  function, adjustment costs, fixed effect; CDIND=  Cobb-
Douglas function,  adjustment  costs, fixed  effect, by industry;  TLNAC= translog function,  no adjustment
costs, fixed effect; CRS= Cobb Douglas-function,  no adjustment  costs, fixed effect, imposing  constant
returns to scale; CRSO= Cobb-Douglas  function, no adjustment  costs, fixed effect, imposing constant
returns to scale, period 1984-1985;  CRS1= Cobb-Douglas  function, no adjustment  costs, fixed effect,
imposing  constant  retums to scale, period 1986-1988.24
In  Table 5. we investigate the correlation between efficiency and firms'
characteristics  (size, age, market orientation). For illustrative purpose we present the
results for the measures  of efficiency obtained, using the within estimator, from the
translog production function, with adjustment costs  estimated separately for  each
industry (TLIND), or  for manufacturing  as a  whole (TLAC). We also present the
results for the Cobb-Douglas  production function estimated imposing the same slope
coefficients for  all  industries, constant returns to  scale, and  no  adjustment costs
(CDCRS).  In all cases we measure the efficiency of individual firms relative to the
most efficient firm in  each industry. 22 The results indicate that,  ceteris paribus,
efficiency increases both with size and age. Moreover, exporting firms appear to be
more efficient than nonexporting  firms. This can be interpreted as evidence that larger
older and  export oriented firms may have an  easier accesss to  the  best practice
technology.  Note that efficiency increases with  size also  for  the  Cobb-Douglas
specification  with constant returns to scale, although the size effect is now generally
smaller and less significant.
22This  is the correct  procedure  when  a  in equation  (1) varies across  industries.25
Table 5
EFFICIENCY  AND FIRMS'  CHARACTERISTICS
Dependent  TLAC  TLIND  CDCRS
variable
Intercept  -3.421  -3.726  -2.882
-(20.39)  -(19.82)  -(19.07)
S2  0.006  -0.030  0.078
(0.03)  (0.16)  (0.53)
S3  0.510  0.452  0.233
(3.11)  (2.46)  (1.58)
S4  1.271  1.233  0.369
(7.53)  (6.51)  (2.43)
A2  0.070  0.001  0.069
(1.56)  (0.02)  (1.71)
A3  0.240  0.210  0.139
(4.90)  (3.83)  (3.15)
A4  0.310  0.255  0.140
(6.08)  (4.45)  (3.03)
EXPS  0.201  0.245  0.137
-________  (4.83)  (5.18)  (3.61)
R2  0.597  0.574  0.195
where: S2, S3, and S4 are size dummies for small, medium, and large firm; A2, A3, and A4 are age
dummies for young, old and oldest firms; EXPS is the export dummy; industry  dummies,denoted  in the
following tables by SEC2 through SEC9, have been included in all  the regressions;  t statistics in
parentheses.
Is firm efficiency one of the factors determining the allocation of credit?
According to  the  financial development literature, firms that have access to  credit
markets in  financially repressed economies are  not  necessarily the  best and  most
efficient ones.  When there is  heavy administrative interference with the  financial
system, large and politically well connected firms may be the ones that benefit from
directed credit. Moreover, the right incentives may not exists for bank in screening
their  borrowers  and  in  monitoring loans.  It  is  believed  that  the  removal of
administrative  controls will help in directing credit to more efficient firms. Table 6
contains the simple correlation coefiicients between the three measures of technical
efficiency  discussed  above, the investment  rate, the profit rate, the growth rate of sales,
and the new debt to capital ratio. The highest correlation is the one between efficiency
and profitability (between  0.299 and 0.451). Obviously,  more efficient firms will tend
to be more profitable. Similarly, there is a significant correlation, although a smaller
one, between efficiency  and real growth rates, suggesting  that more efficient  firms  are
also more dynamic. It is very interesting  to note that the correlation  between efficiency,26
on the one hand, and new debt and investment, on the other, is not significant  in the
pre-liberalization  period. The correlation with both variables is, however, positive and
significant  in the post liberalization  period.
Table  6
CORRELATION  BETWEEN  EFCIENCY  AND SELECTED  INDICATORS
TLAC  I TLIND  CDCRS  TLAC  I TLIND  I CDCRS  TLAC  TLIND  CDCRS
_______  84-88  r  84-85  86-88
P/K  0.306  0.304  0.445  0.291  0.300  0.442  0.324  0.311  0.451
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)
GYREAL  0.124  X.  104  0.154  0.105  0.088  0.174  0.168  0.141  0.135
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.07)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)
I/K  0.019  0.028  0.110  -0.041  -0.033  0.059  0.088  0.097  0.170
__________  (0.58)  (0.42)  (0.00)  (0.40)  (0.50)  (0.23)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.00)
ABT/K  0.054  0.055  0.110  0.005  -0.005  0.069  0.114  0.128  0.160
_(  _  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.0  (0.92)  (0.92)I  (0.16)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.00)
where:
P,'K=  after tax profit  over capital stock; GYREAL  C growth  rate of real sales;  IIK=gross  investment
over capital stock; ABT/K = new debt over capital stock. Marginal probability values in parenthesis.
These simple correlations  suggest that there is some prima facie evidence
that financial liberalization has had a  beneficial effect on  the allocation of  credit.
Additional  evidence can be gathered by analyzing  the determinants  of the change in the
average amount of new debt obtained by each firms in the post liberalization  period,
relative to the pre liberalization  period. The dependent  variable in the regression  is
(AB/K)post  - (AB/K)pre,  where  (AB/K)  is the average  change in debt, relative to the
capital stock,  for  each individual firm.  In  addition to  efficiency, we include as
explanatory  variables size, age, industry, and export dummies. The other regressors are
a set of firm's characteristics  in the pre-liberalization  period, that are meant to capture
the severity of agency problems they face.  The additional explanatory  variables are:
the average real growth rate in real sales (LYREAL), the average degree of leverage
(LBT/K), the average liquid assets to capital ratio (LLA/K), and the average  cash flow
to capital ratio (LCF/K). The results are reported in Table 7.27
Table  7
CHANGE  IN CREDIT  ALLOCATION
Dependent  (AB/K )post  - (AB/K )pre
variable
INTERCEPT  0.370  0.184  0.558
(0.88)  (0.45)  (1.33)
S2  0.215  0.231  0.182
(0.73)  (0.78)  (0.62)
S3  0.227  0.277  0.224
(0.75)  (0.93)  (0.75)
S4  0.213  0.305  0.282
-_________  _  - (0.65)  -(0.  (0.91)
A2  -0.036  -0.029  -0.039
________-_____  -(0.45)  -(0.36)  -(0.49)
A3  -0.063  -0.054  -0.052
-(0.70)  -(0.60)  -(0.59)
A4  -0.169  -0.156  -0.146
-(1.79)  -(1.66)  -(1.56)
SEC2  -0.099  -0.087  -0.200
-(0.85)  -(0.68  -(1.53)
SEC3  -0.321  -0.221  -0.320
_______  -(1.67)  -(1.25)  -(1.90)
SEC4  -0.010  0.026  -0.043
-(0.07)  (0.17)  -(0.32)
SEC5  0.227  0.282  0.072
(1.89)  (2.7  (0.48)
SEC6  -0.008  0.081  -0.300
____________  _ |-(0.05)  (0.57)  (1.36)
SEC7  0.234  0.297  0.067
(I. 19)  (1.56)  (0.31)_
SEC8  0.124  0.158  -0.090
_  _  -_________  =  (0.99)  (1.20)  -(0.52)
SEC9  -0.329  -0.220  -0.486
-(1.24)'  -(0.85)  -(1.77)
EXPS  -0.063  -0.058  -0.061
_____  ________  -(0.82)  -(0.75)  -(0.81)
LYREAL  -0.294  -0.282  -0.319
-(2.91)  -(2.79  -(3.13)
LBTK  -0.222  -0.221  -0.222
____________X_  -(7.87)  -(7.81)  -(7-89)
LLAK  0.182  0.180  0.175
(3.18)  (3.13)  (3.07)
LCFK  -0.111  -0.089  -0.136







R2  0.223  0.219  0.22828
The  debt  to  capital ratio and  the  liquid assets to  capital ratio  have,
respectively,  a negative and a positive significant  effect on the change in the allocation
of new debt. This evidence is consistent with the existence of some agency/financial
distress cost. The basic idea is that highly leveraged firms will face greater marginal
costs of debt and more difficult access to new debt. Conversely, firms with a liquid
position will find easier and cheaper access to credit markets. The effect of previous
growth rate and the amount of cash flow relative to capital stock is also important in
determining  the changes in allocation  of debt. Results suggest that this effect is negative
and significant  for both variables. A possible  explanation  is that profitable  and dynamic
firms can more easily finance their investment  projects with their own resources. The
size age and export dummies are not individually  or jointly significant  at conventional
levels.
The important result is that all three measures of efficiency have positive
effects on the change in debt allocation, and the effect is significantly  different from
zero, in a one tailed test at the 5% significance  level, for two of the three measures.
Controlling for all the other factors mentioned above, credit was flowing in greater
quantity to more efficient firms within each industry after liberalization. In order to
show  that the correlation between debt allocation and efficiency  is not due to reverse
causality (firms that receive credit become  more efficient), we have included in Table 7
a last column of results, obtained  using the efficiency  measure from a constant return to
scale  Cobb-Douglas production  estimated  only  on  the  pre-liberalization years
(CDCRSO). Also in this case the coefficient of CDCRSO is significant  and positive.
Another potential  econometric  problem with the results is that our efficiency  variable is
a generatel regressor that measures  true efficiency  with error. If we believe that banks
themselves do not know true efficiency, but estimate it using the same methods we
have used, then this is not an issue. However, if banks know true efficiency, then we
have a problem of generated regressors, as described in Pagan (1984), with the added
feature that in our case the measurement  error does not disappear, because  in estimating
efficiency  we have used a panel with few time periods.  The result is that the estimates
of the coefficients  and of their standard errors in the debt allocation equation are not
consistent (for N going to  infinity). Fortunately, if  the hypothesis to be tested is
whether the coefficient  on efficiency equals zero, the "asymptotic  t-statistic" obtained
by  using OLS is valid. Hence our conclusion on  the  significance of efficiency in29
explaining  debt allocation  is robust to this potential  criricism. 23
V. CONCLUSIONS
What have we learned from company panel data about  the  effects of
financial liberalization on  Ecuadorian manufacturing firms? Financial liberalization
meant an increase in the cost of credit, and all firms had to readjust their financial
structure. There is evidence that the reduction in the degree of leverage was more
substantial  for small firms.  There are two main reasons that can explain this outcome.
First, with financial  liberalization,  directed credit programs for small firms were either
scaled down or eliminated. Second, even after the removal of administrative  controls,
capital markets are characterized by asymmetric information  problems that are more
severe for small and young firms. This means that these firms may still encounter
difficulties in  gaining  access to  credit  from  financial intermediaries. It  is  very
suggestive  in this respect that the importance  of trade credit increases for all firms in
the post liberal;ization  period, but in particular for the smaller ones. It may be easier
for suppliers to monitor firm's performance. Moreover, the short term nature of trade
credit allows providers to  use non renewal  s  a  mean to  discipline borrowers, if
necessary. One of the criticism levelled at directed credit programs characterized by
very low (often negative)  interest rates is that they distorts factor prices and encourage
capital intensive production techniques. Our data indeed suggest that capital intensity
decreased after liberalization  for medium and large firms. The effect on smaller firms
is more ambiguous.
The analysis of  the effect of  financial liberalization on credit allocation
reflects some of  the points we have already made concerning  the adjustment  in firms'
financial structure.  The data show, in fact, that there was a reallocation  of financial
resources toward the largest and oldest firms. Large firms (together with the medium
ones that see their share of debt decrease) are also those with the better profit record
after liberalization. Finally, a  detailed econometric investigation  of  credit allocation
provides empirical  evidence that financial  liberalization  has helped  in directing  credit to
technically more efficient firms. This is a very interesting  and novel result concerning
the  real  effects of  financial reforms.  We  are  not  suggesting here  that  technical
efficiency should  be used as the sole criterion  in judging whether financial  liberalization
has been successful.  One should find some comfort, however, in the fact that credit
23Note  that the 'symptotic t- statistics  for the other regressors  are not correct.30
allocation has  benefitted those  firms  that  have  access to  the  best  technological
opportunities  and/or make the best use the factors of production  at their disposal.
There are obvious limitations in  the  analysis we have conducted here,
starting with the small number of years at our disposal. Moreover,  the process of
financial  liberalization  does not occur in isolation, and its results depend  upon the other
demand and supply shocks that  affect the economy. A clearer picture will emerge
when we will have  had the opportunity  to observe the changes in the behavior of
institutions and economic agents over a longer time period.  However, we hope that
this paper illustrates the usefulness  of a research strategy based on firms' panel data,
and,  at  the  same  time,  starts  shedding light  on  the  real  effects  of  financial
liberalization.31
APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA
The  empirical  research  was  based  on  information collected  by  the
"Superintendecia  de Companias" (SC) of Ecuador. SC is a government agency that
controls corporate activities. By law, firms have to submit  balance sheet and profit and
losses information to SC in order to do business in Ecuador and in order to obtain
credit (official  loans, as well as regular credit), tax identification  numbers, and so on. 24
After eliminating firms with missing, unacceptable,  or inconsistent  data, or firms not
engaged in  production activities,we obtained a sample of  853 firms with complete
information available for at  least three consecutive years during the period  1983-
1988.25 For 420 firms have  data for the full six-year  period.
The balance sheets also include, together with the standard items, information  on the
revaluation  of assets allowed by the Government  to account for inflation and exchange
rate depreciation. Our capital stock measure is the revalued one and it includes plant
and  machinery, buildings, and others (excluding land).  Investment figures can be
obtained using the information  on capital stock in successive  periods.
The sample represents a very important share of the total manufacturing
sector. Table IA shows the weight of the sample relative to manufacturing:  it covers
almost half of the sales and value added in manufacturing, and around one-third of
manufactured  exports. 26
24Younger  (1990) has worked  with the same  source  of information,  but has aggregated  the data at a four
digit level.
2SWe  have also restricted  the sample to those firms that have a growth rate of sales between  -76% and
500%.
26Export figures refer to sales in  foreign markets made directly by the company. Note that some
companies may export indirectly through trading companies,  though these sales would not appear as
exports. That is why the quantitative  importance  of exports in this survey relative to total manufactured
exports is less  than the share of sales or value  added.32
Table 1A
WEIGHT OF THE SAMPLE RELATIVE TO MANUFACTURING  SECTOR
(frifures  in millions  of 1975  sucres)
Year  Net sales  Value  added  Exports  Y/total  V/total  value  X/total
(Y)  (V)  (  output  added  exports
1983  32317.15  11849.05  2214.19  0.4079  0.406  0.3548
1984  35755.61  12026.1-  2461.09  0.4366  0.4199  0.3371
1985  38525.45  11707.77  2865.12  0.453  0.4078  0.3652
1986  45999.62  14236.39  4826.98  0.5209  0.5041  0.5264
1987  44983.43  13694.49  3560.62  0.4973  0.4767  0.2921
1988  48108.76  13819.49  3577.48  0.5084  0.4704  0.2712
Average  _  0.4707  0.4475  0.3578
Note: Y, V, and X are the figures  for the firms in the panel. Total output, total value added, and total
exports are aggregates  from the National  Accounts. Source: Banco Ceitiral  del Ecuador  (1990), Cuentas
Nacionales  #13.
The sample includes a wide range of firms of different sizes, ages, and
sectors. Most of the companies  are classified  as small or medium  sized(using  the value
of plant and machinery in the first year as the size criterion). 27 There is a  limited
number of micro firms for which (as a group) the quality of data is not very good.
Large firms are also few in number, but very important in terms of their share of total
production.
271t was not possible to use employment  to determine the size of the firm, since no data on labor is
available.  Instead, we used the value of plant and machinery  as the criterion for size. Companies  defined
as small, according  to the size  of the capital stock  we used, were eligible  to receive  special  credit, tax and
other subsidies under the "Ley de Fomento a la Pequeita  Industria y Artesanfa' (Promotion Law for
Small  Industry  and Handicraft).33
Table 2A
NUMBER OF FIRMS IN THE SAMPLE
(By different  categcries)
Category  Frequency  Percent  Cum. Freq.  Cum. Per.
By  size:  (capital  stock)
Micro  42  4.9  42  4.9
Small  284  33.3  326  38.2
Medium  387  45.4  713  83.6
Large  140  16.4  853  100.0
By size: (value added)  _
Micro  31  3.6  31  3.67
6
Small  291  34.1  322  37.7
Medium  395  46.3  717  84.1
Large  136  15.9  853  100.0
By  age:  _  _____________=
Micro  217  25.4  217  25.4
Small  307  36.0  524  61.4
Medium  167  19.6  691  81.0
Large  162  19.0  853  100.0
Dy  markets:
Nonexport  721  84.5  721  84.5
Export  132  15.5  853  100.0
By  sector:  X_X_X_____
31: Food and Beverages  167  19.6  167  19.6
32: Textiles  130  15.2  297  34.8
33: Lumber  52  6.1  349  40.9
34: Paper and Printing  85  10.0  434  50.9
35: Chemicals  162  19.0  596  69.9
36: Metallic  minerals  50  5.9  646  75.7
37: Nonmetallic  minerals  23  2.7  669  78.4
38: Machinery  168  19.7  837  98.1
39: Others  16  1.9  853  100.0
Notes: Definition  of size by capital stock: micro: US$  2000 < K; Small:  US$ 2000 < K <  US$  40000;
Medium: US$  40000 <  K <  US$  600000; Large: K > US$ 600000. Definition  of size by value  added:
micro: US$ 2000 <  V; Small: US$ 2000 <  V  <  US$ 40000; Medium: US$ 40000 <  V  <  ItS$
600000; Large: V > US$ 600000. K:  machinery,  plant. and equipment,  other (excluding  land)  in 1983;
V: value added in 1893; both K and V are valued at 1975 US$  dollars. Definition  of age: youngest:  bom
after 1980; young: bom between  1970 and 1980;  old: born between 1960  and 1970; oldest: born before
1960. Definition  of export oriented: firm must have exported  at least once during the period.34
If we do a cross-tabulation  between different  categories, we find that most
micro, small and medium  sized firms began their activities  aiter 1970, while the
majority of large firms were born before the 1970s, as Table 3A shows. It is also true
that export firms are either medium  or large sized.
Table 3A
FIRMS  BY SIZE  AGE, AND MARKET
Size\Age  Youngest  Young  Old  Oldest  Export  Nonexport
Micro  17  23  2  0  0  42
Small  91  129  44  20  14  270
Medium  98  137  76  76  60  327
Large  11  18  45  66  58  8235
APPENDIX B: ESTIMATION OF THE EFFICIENCY INDEX
This appendix  presents the econometric  results for different specifications
of the production function, using different  estimation methods.  The estimates  are used
to obtain the technical  efficiency  index used in the paper.36
Table 1B
PRODUCTION FUNCTION ESTIMATES
Same slope coeMffcients  across industries
Dependent  variable  v=lo  of value  added
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
k  0.103  0.105  0.222  0.110  0.075  0.044  0.229
(4.58)  (4.72)  (13.38)  (5.22)  (1.88)  (0.13)  (9.47)
11  0.346  0.346  0.416  0.374  0.285  0.396  0.504
(14.33)  (14.31)  (20.86)  (16.86)  (9.71)  (1.28)  (26.96)
12  0.295  0.294  0.394  0.203  0.217  0.139  0.267
k27~  (12.74)  (12.71)  (23.15)  (12.56)  (7.61)  (0.42)  (17.40)
-0.012  -0.011  0.004  -0.011  -0.077
-(1.64)  -(1.55) (0.66)  -(0.97)  -(0.98)
11______  t0.035  0.035  0.049  0.019  0.034
(4.35)  (4.37)  (7.08)  (8.85)  (1.58)
0.019  0.019  0.035  0.012  0.007
(3.80)  (3.78)  (8.58  _  (6.08)  (0.24)
kll  -0.009  -0.009  -0.011  0.002  0.008  _  -
2-(.24)  -(2.19)  4LI  (0.30)  (0.11)  _
k12  0.006  _0.006  0.002  -0.006  -0.020
(0.51)  (0.51)  (0-18)  -(0.82)  -(0.31)
1112  -0.061  -0.060  -0.080  -0.013  -0.005
T  <_  |  -(4.63)  1  -(4.60)  -(7.23  -(1.59)  -(0.05  __  _
nc/K  0.000  o________  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001
_(0.9)  (0.11)  (0.40)  (0.57)  (0.41)
D85  -0.061  -0.061  -0.075  -0.058  -0.072
_______  -(3.05)  -(3.03)  -(3.76)  -(2.84)  -(3.47)
D86  -0.041  -0.040  -0.061  -0.038  -0.056
_______  -(2.05)  -(1.99)  -(3.02)  -(1.84)  -(2.70)
D87  -0.117  -0.114  -0.133  -0.108  -0.127
-(5.63)  -(5.56)  -(6.50)  -. 19)  -(5.99)
D88  -0.206  -0.202  -0.244  -0.195  -0.006  0.029  -0.228
-(9.47)  -(9.44)  -(11.72)  (9-10)  -(0.20)  (0.56)  -(10.67)
ONE  0.284  _  -0.076  -0.104
(10.18)  -(4.16)  -(2.09)
R2adj.  0.967  0.967  0.911  0.966  0.212  0.110  0.903
X1  7653.3  7652.2  7592.9  211.7  22.0  3306.6
d.f.  432  432  427  10  10  419







Variables  are defined  in equation  (3); small case letters denote logs; Xl: chi-square  tests on the equality  of the firm
specific constants;  Haussman: chi-square  test of the GLS estimator  for the random  effect model against the within
estimator; Sargan: chi-square test of overidentifying  restrictions; degrees of  freedom and p-values below tests;
column. (1): within estimator; (2): within, no adjustment  cost; (3): GLS for random effect; (4): within, Cobb-
Douglas;  (5): first differences,  OLS;  (6): first  differences,  GMM; (7):  within,  Cobb-Douglas,  constant returns.37
Table 2B
PRODUCTION FUNCTION ESTIMATES
Translog production function by sector
Dependent  variable  I  v=log of value  added
Sec. 31  Sec. 32  Sec. 33  Sec. 34  Sec. 35  Sec. 36  Sec. 37  Sec. 38  Sec. 39
k  0.037  0.200  0.052  0.070  0.066  0.189  -0.260  0.089  0.482
(0.61)  (3.46)  (0.69)  (1.45)  (1.00)  (1.39)  -(1.16)  (1.79)  (2.57)
11  0.393  0.280  0.377  0.455  0.222  0.371  0.888  0.521  0.285
(4.76)  (6.20)  (3.59)  (4.91)  (2.85)  (3.09)  (2.81)  (9.02)  (2.77)
12  0.257  0.319  0.215  0.315  0.300  -0.026  -0.023  0.435  0.360
(4.29)  (5.18)  (2.71)  (4.91)  (5.09)  -(0.13)  -(0.06)  (7.78)  (2.44)
k2  -0.005  -0.021  -0.042  -0.016  0.014  0.034  -0.042  -0.024  -0.149
-(0.25)  -(1.25)  -(1.69)  -(0.74)  (0.58)  (0.81)  -(1.23)  -(1.33)  -(2.07)
11  Z  0.012  0.079  0.133  0.016  0.042  -0.196  0.115  0.021  0.192
(0.56)  (4.92)  (2.59)  (0.48)  (1.55)  -(3.94)  (2.65)  (0.87)  (2.10)
122  0.030  0.054  0.067  0.019  0.051  -0.081  0.227  0.043  0.347
(3.20)  (2.22)  (1.77)  (1.06)  (2.39)  -(1.38)  (1.90)  (1.73)  (4.52)
kll  -0.036  0.007  -0.012  -0.003  -0.004  -0.008  -0.014  -0.014  -0.062
-(2.79)  (0.67)  -(0.97)  -(0.36)  -(0.29)  -(0.53)  -(0.47)  -(1.24)  -(0.62)
k12  -0.001  0.033  0.096  0.058  -0.070  -0.150  0.200  -0.002  0.026
-(0.02)  (0.95)  (1.32)  (1.89)  -(1.68)  -(1.95)  (1.75j  -(0.05)  (0.26)
1112  -0.018  -0.120  -0.268  -0.092  -0.044  0.388  -0.393  -0.140  -0.477
-(0.78)  -(2.90)  -(3.51)  -(1.77)  -(1.03)  (3.58)  -(2.59)  -(3.46)  -(2.87)
0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  -0.001  0.001  0.002
(1.28)  -(0.11)  -(0.08)  -(0.17)  (1.07)  -(0.14)  -(0.48)  (1.14)  (0.22)
D85  -0.141  -0.109  0.122  0.053  -0.085  0.120  -0.004  -0.075  -0.027
-(3.04)  -(2.39)  (1.76)  (1.13)  -(1.70)  (1.28)  -(0.04)  -(1.72)  -(0.32)
D86  -0.048  -0.050  0.163  -0.026  -0.068  0.150  -0.205  -0.051  -0.241
-(1.03)  -(1.07)  (2.37)  -(0.55)  -(1.35)  (1.46)  -(1.74)  -(1.17)  -(2.87)
D87  0.021  -0.163  -0.048  -0.183  -0.166  0.125  -0.111  -0.177  -0.219
(0.44)  -(3.50)  -(0.64)  -(3.73)  -(3.23)  (1.21)  -(0.82)  -(3.92)  -(2.56)
D88  -0.011  -0.203  -0.170  -0.327  -0.351  0.090  -0.415  -0.248  -0.395
(0.22)  (4.15)  -(2.16)  -(6.53)  -(6.64)  (074  -(2.40)  -(5.04)  -(4.21)
Nobs.  405  315  115  240  430  110  65  370  50
R2adj.  0.966  0.976  0.976  0.978  0.953  0.971  0.976  0.974  0.97938
Table  3B
PRODUCTION  FUNCTION  ESTIMATES
Cobb-Douglas  production  function  by sector
Sec. 31  Sec. 32  Sec. 33  Sec. 34  Sec. 35  Sec. 36  Sec. 37  Sec. 38  Sec. 39
k  0.050  0.221  0.131  0.078  0.028  0.287  0.071  0.116  0.536
(0.96)  (4.11)  (2.03)  (1.73)  (0.51)  (3.09)  (0.61)  (2.44)  (4.09)
11  0.415  0.226  0.518  0.425  0.260  0.341  0.293  0.479  0.490
(8.11)  (5.04)  (5.67)  (7.29)  (4.07)  (2.83)  (2.16)  (9.20)  (5.88)
12  0.148  0.241  0.037  0.281  0.183  0.125  0.282  0.327  -0.252
(5.42)  (5.46)  (0.62)  (6.91)  (4.22)  (1.25)  (2.19)  (7.77)  -(2.46)
ii2  0.001  0.000  -0.001  0.000  0.000  -0.001  -0.002  0.001  -0.006
(1.20)  (0.25)  -(0.62)  -(0.19)  (0.32)  -(1.24)  -(1.23)  (0.70)  -(0.65)
D85  -0.130  -0.106  0.121  0.036  -0.097  0.137  0.029  -0.093  -0.075
-(2.81)  -(2.24)  (1.71)  (0.78)  -(1.92)  (1.36)  (0.2.6)  -(2.06)  0.70)
D86  -0.047  -0.051  0.155  -0.043  -0.066  0.087  -0.169  -0 063  -0.202
_  -(1.02)  -(1.06)  (2.17)  -(0.93)  -(1.30)  (0.80)  -(1.47)  -(  J9)  -(1.82)
D87  0.028  -0.147  -0.025  -0.201  -0.160  0.092  -0.031  -0.188  -0.150
(0.59)  -(3.05)  -(0.34)  -(4.20)  -(3.12)  (0.86)  -(0.24)  -(4.09)  -(1.40)
D88  0.005  -0.167  -0.116  1-0.335  -0.335  -0.023  -0.137  -0.295  -0.184
________  (0.10)  -(3.35)  -(1.53)  -(7.01)  -(6.41)  -(0.21)  -(0.94)  -(6.05)  -(1.69)
Nobs.  405  315  115  240  430  110  65  370  50
I R2adj.  1  0.966  1  0.975  1  0.972  0.978  0.952  0.966  0.973  0.972  0.96139
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